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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of director tenure diversity on board effectiveness. We find that 
tenure-diverse boards exhibit significantly higher CEO performance-turnover sensitivity and that 
firms with tenure-diverse audit committees are less likely to experience accounting restatements. 
Furthermore, we document that tenure-diverse compensation committees also award less excess 
compensation and are less likely to overcompensate. Even though tenure-diverse boards seem 
to exhibit superior monitoring performance, there is limited evidence that their firms exhibit 
superior financial performance. The findings suggest that recent calls for board renewal, to the 
extent that it would increase tenure diversity rather than just decrease average board tenure, may 
help enhance board monitoring. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent international proposals to impose term limits on independent directors have reignited 
the debate around the ideal length of director tenure. The motivation for such proposals is to 
ensure that “the purpose behind the independent director rule is not lost.”1 
While some firms limit director terms, their limits tend to be long.2 Some practitioners and 
regulators have even questioned whether optimal board tenure exists. For the most part, 
however, firms and regulators acknowledge the benefits of long tenure, including knowledge 
continuity and boardroom collegiality. Even so, governance experts have recently raised concerns 
about the potential costs of longer director tenure. These costs may include a loss of independence 
and the lack of agility and adaptability.3 
The idea that tenure length may be associated with board effectiveness is not new. An issue 
explored in governance studies is whether board tenure length, among the many director attributes 
studied, affects a board’s ability to monitor management. Some researchers hypothesize that 
longer tenure should result in better monitoring, since tenure length decreases directors’ 
susceptibility to management influence (e.g., Beasley 1996) and increases their firm- specific 
knowledge (Bacon and Brown 1973). In contrast, other scholars expect longer tenure to lead to 
greater commitment to the status quo (Janis 1982; Staw and Ross 1980; Stevens et al. 1978) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 http://business.inquirer.net/36337/new-sec-rules-on-independent-directors. For example, in the Philippines, 
independent directors’ term limits were established as of 2012 to combat potentially impaired independence. 
2 Continuing the conversation: Board renewal (PwC Center for Board Governance, Fall 2011). 
3 Canavan, Judy, Blair Jones, and Mary Jo Potter, 2004, Board tenure: How long is too long? Directors & Boards, 
January 1. 
and board entrenchment, resulting in weaker monitoring (e.g., Anderson et al. 2004). 
Empirical studies provide mixed evidence.4 
One way to examine the pros and cons of board tenure is to explore the optimal average 
board tenure—aiming to identify a timespan that minimizes agency conflict while maximizing 
firm-specific knowledge—and to encourage firms to adhere to it. A downside of that approach is 
that such a target is necessarily stringent and therefore may be impractical to implement or 
maintain. A second way to tackle the issue of the optimal tenure length is to consider the 
diversity in the length of directors’ tenure, rather than the average.5 Using this technique, research 
has shown that both the characteristics (traits) and the variety (diversity) of team members’ 
cognitive resources are important in understanding team performance (Hoffman 1959; Hoffman 
and Maier 1961; Triandis et al. 1965). The importance of studying variation among board 
members has been further emphasized by Morck et al. (1988). As research points out, simply 
examining the average of a board characteristic does not capture the diversity of information 
sources and perspectives (Wiersema and Bantel 1992). Boards with diverse director tenure 
lengths may recognize the benefits of having both senior and junior directors, leading to 
knowledge continuity as well as independence. While empirical findings are mixed with regard 
to the effect of board demographic diversity, the underlying theory that predicts that diverse 
director characteristics impact board efficacy applies in this setting as well. Tenure diversity has 
4 Anderson et al. (2004) document a positive association between board tenure length and financing costs, implying 
weaker management monitoring and greater entrenchment. Beasley (1996) finds that tenure length decreases the 
likelihood of fraud, implying stronger management monitoring. 
 
5 To implement a policy that stipulates an optimal mean tenure would require boards to focus on meeting a particular 
target annually, which would mean that they would have to replace the board member whose departure would bring 
the board closest to the optimum. Tenure length diversity, by contrast, only stipulates that there ought to be a mix of 
directors in terms of their tenure lengths. This means the board retains the flexibility to determine whether and when 
to replace a board member.
an unique aspect relative to diversity in general: other dimensions of diversity rely on the 
assumption that directors with different demographic and background characteristics will have 
divergent opinions, an assumption questioned by prior research (Harrison et al. 1998, 2002). 
Tenure diversity does not require this assumption. 
While tenure-diverse board members may vary in how they think, even without such a 
difference, tenure diversity offers benefits. As directors join the board at different times, this 
decreases the probability of group cohesiveness, which can lead to groupthink (Janis 1982). In 
addition, O’Reilly et al. (1989) find that team tenure diversity decreases a team’s social 
integration and mutual attraction and, Wiersema and Bantel (1992) hypothesize that heterogeneous 
team tenure leads to new and different perspectives and prevents the “cohort phenomenon.” 
Although socially integrated teams may be desirable in other settings, on corporate boards, they 
may be prone to groupthink and complacency and thus may ineffectively monitor firm 
management. 
Despite the theoretical arguments that demographic diversity should result in diverse 
opinions and better governance, the empirical evidence to date is mixed. The assumption that a 
particular type of observed demographic diversity captures cognitive differences may be a 
contributing factor to the generally inconclusive evidence for the benefit of such diversity in the 
board setting. Some studies find limited benefits from this type of diversity (Adams and Ferreira 
2009; Carter et al. 2003; Gul et al. 2011), while others fail to find such benefits (Ahern and 
Dittmar 2011; Gray and Nowland 2015; Knyazeva et al. 2009). 
A potential explanation for the mixed prior results is that differences in opinions even if 
captured by the variation in demographic characteristics, may be accompanied by costs. There is 
evidence that decisions made by diverse groups may not result in better outcomes as 
diversity increases internal conflict and divisiveness (Simons and Peterson 2000) and obstructs 
coordination and communications (van den Steen 2010). This results in animosity, dissatisfaction, 
and the failure to reach agreement (Wall and Nolan 1986). With respect to organizational tenure, 
heterogeneous groups tend to have difficulty communicating, relative to homogeneous teams 
(McCain et al. 1983). Yet, even if some dissent is desirable and more likely to occur in more 
diverse groups, it is not clear that differences within cohorts lead to long-term disagreements. 
New directors may begin to conform to the group norms, and a board may revert to its original 
level of cohesiveness.6 Consequently, director tenure diversity may have no effect or obtain 
effects opposite to those advocated by the regulators. Ultimately, it is an empirical question 
whether greater tenure diversity enhances board effectiveness. 
Our empirical findings support the hypothesis that tenure-diverse boards better monitor the 
CEO. Specifically, tenure-diverse boards appear to be (1)  more sensitive to performance when 
replacing the CEO, ( 2 ) less frequently associated with accounting restatements, ( 3 )  more 
likely to replace the CEO if a restatement occurs, and ( 4 )  less likely to overcompensate the 
CEO. We find no evidence, however, that tenure diversity is associated with better future market 
performance and very little evidence it is associated with better future accounting performance. 
Our results are consistent with prior studies that find that increased monitoring may interfere 
with the board’s advisory role (Adams and Ferreira 2007). Since we focus on the role of tenure 
diversity in the context of tasks for which boards are directly responsible (e.g., CEO 
replacement), endogeneity poses a less severe concern, relative to settings where board 
effectiveness is inferred indirectly, such as through firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach 
2003). Nonetheless, our research design addresses the issue of correlated omitted variable bias, 
 
6 Some experimental studies observe that group development happens fairly quickly, with cohesiveness developing 
as early as 10 weeks to six months into a group’s formation (Tuckman 2001).
which increases confidence when drawing causal inferences: we employ a firm- fixed effect 
specification in the CEO turnover-performance analysis. 
We lag tenure diversity and the control variables relative to the outcome variable to reduce 
simultaneity or reverse-causality concerns. To further mitigate endogeneity concerns, we 
implement an instrumental variable approach. Even so, we are unable to rule out that endogeneity 
affects our results and thus leave it up to the readers to decide whether to draw causal inferences 
from the findings. 
Our study contributes to research on board composition in the following three ways. First, it 
extends the literature showing that board tenure influences governance effectiveness. Prior 
studies are mixed regarding the impact of board tenure on governance; our study provides a 
different perspective on board tenure and its importance in relation to board effectiveness. 
Second, this work may contribute to the regulatory discussions around the importance of 
board member term limits. By shifting the focus to the mix of director tenure lengths, this study 
provides evidence that tenure diversity matters for effective governance. Furthermore, our 
evidence suggests that board renewal initiatives may not be baseless; we find support for the 
notion that, in some instances, limiting director terms may result in better governance if doing 
so alters the mix of tenure lengths. 
Third, our study suggests that director tenure diversity, which can be achieved through board 
renewal initiatives, may organically introduce perspective diversity. By introducing dimensions 
of director diversity other than those primarily targeted by regulators, we extend the current 
literature on board composition and diversity, most of which focuses exclusively on gender or 
expertise. While other dimensions of diversity may be beneficial, they rely on the assumption 
that demographically different directors will hold differing perspectives. Tenure diversity, by 
contrast, can lead to better group dynamics even without this assumption. Our study controls for 
these other forms of board diversity to show that tenure diversity has an incremental effect above 
and beyond the effects found through other forms of diversity. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature 
and the motivation for the study and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample along 
with the source of the data. Sections 4 to 7 present the results of our analyses. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Diversity and board performance 
We examine the role of director tenure diversity in the context of the major board task—CEO 
replacement. There are two major mechanisms through which diversity is broadly believed to 
boost group performance: perspective diversity (Wiersema and Bantel 1992; van Knippenberg et 
al. 2004) and better access to information and resources (Hambrick and Mason 1984). 
Perspective diversity is believed to generate better discussions and deliberations (Jehn et al. 
1999) and create a culture of communication and questioning (van Knippenberg et al. 2004). As 
a result, diverse groups achieve better outcomes than homogeneous groups. Perspective diversity 
also increases independence: heterogeneous directors are likely to ask questions that would not 
arise within a homogeneous group.  Diverse boards are considered the “ultimate outsiders” 
(Carter et al. 2003). 
The second mechanism, better access to information and resources, improves the board’s 
ability to carry out its duties. The amount and nature of information that directors possess have 
great impacts on board effectiveness (Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010). Boards are the primary 
link between the firm and its external sources of dependency (Hillman et al. 2007). By bringing 
a group of diverse individuals together, boards gain access to broader sets of information, 
knowledge, skills, and talent (Pfeffer 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Zald 1969).  These benefits 
stem from directors’ human capital and relationship capital (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). 
Board diversity is often discussed in the context of the demographic characteristics of the 
board members. Prior studies have mainly examined gender diversity and, to a lesser extent, 
expertise or experience diversity. The findings are mixed. While Carter et al. (2003) find an 
association between gender diversity and firm value, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that 
gender diversity improves only the monitoring role of the board and only in weakly governed 
firms. Ahern and Dittmar (2011), by contrast, find that the value of firms that are forced to adopt 
increased gender diversity declines. Gul et al. (2011) show that board gender diversity improves 
the informativeness of stock prices. While results regarding the impact of gender diversity on 
governance are mixed, the benefits of expertise diversity seem even less convincing. Gray and 
Nowland (2015) find that broad expertise diversity, in general, does not impact firm value but 
that diversity along a limited subset of expert skills does. Knyazeva et al. (2009) find that 
director industry expertise diversity leads to lower firm value. 
While empirical findings on the benefits of board diversity, defined broadly, are 
inconclusive, the theoretical underpinnings that suggest potential benefits of diversity apply to 
tenure diversity as well. In addition, tenure determines individuals’ cohort membership and 
defines experiences, perspectives, and values (O’Reilly et al. 1989; Pfeffer 1983). Research 
shows that tenure-homogenous teams create more socially cohesive groups (O'Reilly et al. 1989), 
a trait that can be more desirable in settings other than governance (Kosnik 1990). From a 
governance perspective, boards that are too cohesive and friendly tend to lack the ability to 
effectively monitor due to complacency and groupthink (Herman 1981). Conversely, tenure- 
diverse boards should possess the desire and ability to undertake changes; this prevents 
complacency, which often leads to board failures (Kosnik 1990). Less cohesiveness likewise 
minimizes the probability of groupthink, even if the team members otherwise have homogenous 
opinions. This characteristic sets tenure diversity apart from other dimensions of diversity: it 
does not rely on the assumption that board members diversity along an observable characteristic 
makes them think differently, an assumption that some studies have disputed (Harrison et al. 1998, 
2002). 
Additionally, tenure diversity may derive benefits from another source. Firms with tenure- 
diverse boards may benefit from having the best of both worlds—directors with longer tenures 
may better understand firm-specific issues and avoid capture by the CEO, while those with 
shorter tenures may not be entrenched and thus bring fresh perspective to board discussions. 
Despite the possible benefits of tenure diversity and of diversity more broadly, heterogeneous 
groups face several well-known obstacles to effective functioning. These include lack of 
cohesiveness (Jackson et al. 1991); inability to reach satisfactory agreement, leading to 
excessive conflict and animosity (Simons and Peterson 2000); coordination issues (van den 
Steen 2010); and diversion of time toward persuasion and conflict (Baranchuk and Dybvig 
2009). The same factors that can make a board more effective can also be its downfall. 
Consequently, diversity is often deemed a double-edged sword (Milliken and Martins 1996). 
There are other factors that may make tenure diversity ineffective at improving monitoring. 
For instance, the theory of the cohort effect assumes that the benefit of including individuals 
from different cohorts lasts for a long time. It is not clear, however, that this is true. Studies 
on group development (e.g., Tuckman 1965; 2001; Tuckman and Jensen 1977) have found 
that group dynamics change with the length of time the individuals are in the group. In the 
initial stages, groups experience orientation and dissent, but in the latter stages of group 
development, cohesion arises, regardless of individual differences. Some studies have 
observed the appearance of cohesion as early as 10 weeks to six months after individuals form 
a group. To the extent that cohesion arises rapidly in governance settings as well, it is not 
clear that rotating board members in and out will produce lasting benefits. 
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Finally, while it is generally believed that cohesion can lead to groupthink, it is not clear 
that differences in opinion in tenure-diverse groups are likely to be expressed in a noncohesive, 
less friendly environment. The group development theory (Tuckman 1965) posits that the 
free and open exchange of differing opinions is most likely to occur at the later stages of 
group development, after members identify with each other. If that is the case, tenure-diverse 
boards may cultivate different opinions, but it is not clear that these differences would be 
revealed during board discussions if the environment is sufficiently contentious.  
Consistent with the lack of clear expectations for the effect of diversity in board settings, 
prior studies, which primarily focus on the diversity of boards by considering visible 
demographic characteristics, have found mixed results. To our knowledge, there have been 
no studies examining the effect of tenure diversity on boards’ ability to monitor management 
effectively. 
 
3. Data 
Sample selection 
A 13-year sample, from 2000 to 2012, is selected from the universe of ExecuComp firms. From 
this sample, we eliminate firms not covered by BoardEx and firms without the required financial 
information in Compustat or stock price information in CRSP. The final sample used in the CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity tests consists of 13,903 firm-year observations and 1,966 unique 
firms. For the test examining CEO turnover after a restatement, the subsample of firms with a 
restatement announcement is used, reducing the sample to 870 firm-year observations. For the test 
examining post-CEO replacement performance, the sample is reduced to the set of observations 
during which the CEO is replaced and for which future performance data is available, resulting in 
a sample of 867 firm years. Finally, for the test examining the likelihood of restatement as a 
12 
 
function of tenure diversity, the sample is reduced to include only observations starting in 2002, 
as that is the first full year of Audit Analytics coverage, resulting in a final sample of 11,170 firm-
year observations (5,097 in the conditional logit model, conditional on a firm having at least one 
restatement announcement during the sample period).  
For each director in the sample, we collect tenure information as well as other demographic 
information from BoardEx, financial information from Compustat, and the required compensation 
data from ExecuComp. Information about the CEOs (age, tenure, gender, turnover, and role 
duality) is obtained from ExecuComp and supplemented by data available in RiskMetrics. All 
restatement-related data is from Audit Analytics. To calculate board expertise and board 
nationality diversity control measures, we supplement BoardEx with data hand-collected from the 
internet.  
Tenure diversity variables 
We construct the tenure diversity measure in two different ways. First, since tenure is a continuous 
variable, tenure diversity is measured as a coefficient of variation, CV_tenure. The coefficient of 
variation is defined as: 
CVit = it /it. 
Although it is standard to use the coefficient of variation in organizational behavior literature 
when calculating the diversity of a dimension captured by a continuous variable, it has a drawback 
in that it can be affected by large values. Therefore we construct an additional tenure diversity 
variable, HHI_tenure. To calculate HHI_tenure, we convert the continuous tenure variable into a 
discrete variable ranging from one to 10 (10 categories of tenure, with 1 being the shortest and 10 
the longest), based on which decile each director’s tenure falls into. Then we use the ten deciles to 
create the tenure diversity measure for each firm-year where 
13 
 
HHI_tenure = 1 – ∑ (Total Directors in Category𝑥/Total Directors)
210
𝑥=1  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. Panel A shows the financial characteristics 
of the sample firms. The selected firms are large; mean and median market capitalizations for a 
sample firm are $7.6 billion and $7.5 billion, respectively, reflecting ExecuComp’s focus on large 
firms. The median firm in the sample is a growth firm, with a book-to-market ratio of 0.46, and 
profitable, with a return on assets (ROA) of 5.1%. There is a large variation in leverage, with 0.05 
and 0.34 at the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. Similarly, for the annual stock returns, -16% 
and 26% are the 25th and 75th percentiles respectively. 
Since both the CEO and incumbent members of the board have a say in nominating incoming 
directors, the structure of the board and characteristics of the CEO may affect board diversity. For 
this reason, we control for CEO characteristics in all tests. Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics of such variables. Only 2.7% of the firms in the sample have a female CEO. The CEO 
also serves as the chairman of the board for more than half of the sample firms. Most board 
members (83%) are independent7, and the median board has eight directors (exp(2.079)). On average, 38% 
of the compensation awarded to the five highest earners is allocated to the CEO.
Table 2 provides additional information about differences in firm characteristics between firms 
with highly tenure-homogenous boards and those with highly tenure-heterogeneous ones. 
Homogeneous (heterogeneous) boards are those below (at or above) the median of the tenure 
diversity measure. Firms with diverse boards are significantly larger and more complex, as 
measured by the number of geographic and business segments. Compared to firms with 
homogeneous boards, those with diverse boards are more likely to have an older CEO with a 
                                                          
7 This figure excludes CEO/board chairman. Including the CEO, the percentage of independent directors over our 
sample period is 83.5%.  
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shorter firm tenure. The accounting performance of such firms is marginally higher relative to 
firms with homogeneous boards, but the stock performance is significantly weaker. Finally, tenure-
diverse boards are larger and relatively more independent, have lower institutional ownership, and 
are somewhat more diverse along other dimensions as well.  
Table 3 presents Pearson’s correlation matrix of the variables used throughout the study. The 
values in bold represent correlations that are significant at the 5% level or better. The two measures 
of tenure diversity have a correlation figure of 0.54 (p-value of 0.000), indicating that they 
represent a similar construct. 
4. Tenure diversity and performance-related CEO turnover 
One of a board’s most important tasks is selecting and replacing the CEO (Hermalin 2005). 
Research has shown that boards considered better monitors are more likely to replace the CEO 
following poor stock performance (Weisbach 1988; Yermack 1996). Weisbach (1988) also shows 
that turnover-performance sensitivity is heightened for boards with more independent directors. 
Turnover-performance sensitivity has been previously explored as a function of other board 
characteristics, such as gender (Adams and Ferreira 2009), monitoring intensity (Faleye et al. 
2011), busy directors (Fich and Shivdasani 2006), and the presence of founders on the board (Li 
and Srinivasan 2011), among others. 
If diverse boards engage in better dialogue and tougher discussions, as asserted by the 
literature, their ability to monitor the CEO is likely to be better. Since perspective diversity is 
believed to increase the true independence of the board, tenure-diverse boards should be more 
willing to replace the CEO when firm performance is poor. However, prior findings indicate that 
diversity can have a counter-effect by leading to disagreement and a lack of coordination. To the 
extent that a board is unsure whether to replace its CEO, perspective diversity might lead to 
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indecisiveness and disagreement about the best course of action. This, in turn, might lead to a 
decreased board sensitivity to firm performance and slower reactions to performance signals. Since 
both benefits and costs of director tenure diversity may exist, it is not clear whether tenure diversity 
will result in more or less turnover-performance sensitivity. To examine the effect of tenure 
diversity on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, we estimate the following model: 
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4−7𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽8−11𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
  𝛽12−15𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16−21𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22−40𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀                                     (1)                                                                                            
 
We define CEO turnover (CEO_Turnover) as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO leaves 
the post involuntarily in year t+1. We follow the standard procedure developed by Parrino (1997) 
to identify involuntary departures.8 Our measure of stock performance (StockReturns) is each 
firm’s annual return in t minus the CRSP value-weighted index during the same period, 
compounded monthly.9 Tenure diversity measures are defined previously in section 3. Consistent 
with prior research, we control for firm performance and CEO characteristics that may affect the 
likelihood of CEO turnover, such as CEO age (CEOAge), gender (CEOGender), tenure 
(CEOTenure), CEO power proxied by CEO pay slice (CEOPaySlice) (Bebchuk et al. 2011), and 
                                                          
8 Since some prior studies modify the Parrino (1997) approach and use 65, instead of 60, as the cut-off age prior to 
which CEO departure is deemed involuntary, we check the robustness of our findings by using the alternative cut-off. 
The results are similar, and all of the heterogeneity variables are significant at the originally reported probability 
levels.  
9 To examine the possibility that turnover-performance sensitivity is affected by the choice of market index used to 
adjust the firm’s raw returns, we recalculate market-adjusted returns using the equally weighted index and median 
industry (two-digit sic) returns. The results using the two alternative measures of market-adjusted returns are 
qualitatively the same, and heterogeneity variables are still significant at originally reported levels. Using equally 
weighted or median industry returns instead of a value-weighted index to adjust raw returns does not affect our results. 
Also, using an accounting-based performance measure (ROA) yields substantively similar results.  
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the duality of the CEO/chairman role (CEODuality). Additionally, we control for firm 
characteristics and important governance characteristics, such as board independence 
(BoardIndependence), board size (BoardSize), and percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors (InstitutionalOwnership), which have been shown to affect the likelihood of CEO 
turnover. Since we wish to examine whether tenure diversity offers an incremental monitoring 
benefit over other sources of diversity, we control for other dimensions of diversity such as gender 
(Gender_Diversity), age (Age_Diversity), functional experience (Expertise_Diversity), and 
nationality (Nationality_Diversity). Furthermore, since tenure diversity may be a proxy for tenure 
length, which is a related but distinct construct, we include mean board tenure length 
(Tenure_Length) as a control variable as well. Following the approach in Li and Srinivasan (2011), 
we interact all control variables in the CEO turnover-performance analysis with the firm’s stock 
performance. This approach eliminates any portion of the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity 
attributable to other governance or firm characteristics included in the model other than board 
tenure diversity.  
Table 4 Panel A shows a multivariate analysis of CEO performance-based turnover as a 
function of director tenure diversity and other variables hypothesized to affect turnover-
performance sensitivity. The variable of primary interest is the interaction term of tenure diversity 
and stock returns. Boards considered to be better monitors are expected to have a significantly 
negative coefficient β3. For each of the two tenure diversity measures, the first specification shows 
the logistic model estimates, the second model presents results from the linear probability model 
with firm fixed effects, and the third model specification shows the firm fixed effect conditional 
logit model. Finally, we include an instrumental variable specification in our final model (3). 
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 The results show that boards with higher tenure diversity are more performance sensitive and 
consequently increase the likelihood of replacing the CEO as the stock price declines. The β3 
coefficient estimate for the first tenure diversity measure, CV_TenureBD, is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level (p-value of 0.029). For the second tenure diversity measure, 
HHI_TenureBD, the β3 coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level (p-value 
of 0.066).10 
Among the endogeneity concerns associated with attributing CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity to director diversity, omitted variable bias is the most relevant. We seek to mitigate this 
concern by controlling for factors previously shown to affect turnover-performance sensitivity, 
namely, factors that could be correlated with board diversity. To further address the issue of 
omitted time-invariant variables, we also use a firm fixed-effects specification. To the extent that 
the correlated omitted variable is time invariant, a firm fixed-effect specification should mitigate 
the concerns related to this type of endogeneity. To reduce the possibility that simultaneity and 
reverse causality impact our test results, board composition is observed at the beginning of the 
year, CEO turnover is observed during the entire year, and stock performance is measured over 
the prior year. Still, we cannot eliminate endogeneity concerns, and we leave it up to the reader to 
interpret the findings as either documenting an association between tenure diversity and our 
outcome variables of interest or implying a causal relationship between the two.  
Accounting for the possibility of an omitted time-invariant variable by estimating a firm fixed 
effects linear probability model leads to a similar conclusion. The results from firm fixed-effects 
regressions show that firms with tenure-diverse boards (p-values of 0.001 and 0.001, respectively) 
                                                          
10 The subscript BD is added to the tenure diversity variable names (CV_Tenure and HHI_Tenure) to denote when the 
variables are calculated for the full board, while the subscripts AC and CC are added when the measures are calculated 
for the subset of directors who form the audit committee or the compensation committee of the board, respectively.  
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exhibit an increase in the likelihood of replacing the CEO, compared to less tenure-diverse boards, 
as the firms’ market-adjusted performance for the prior year decreases. In an untabulated analysis, 
we estimate the conditional logistic model with firm fixed effects and find similar results; the level 
of board tenure diversity is associated with an increased likelihood of turnover-performance 
sensitivity, even if we condition on firms experiencing CEO turnover within the sample period (p-
values of 0.041 and 0.022).  
Finally, as the firm fixed-effects specification cannot address all sources of endogeneity, we 
implement an instrumental variable approach to estimating CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. 
Finding good instruments in this setting poses a challenge. Zald (1969) argues that the location of 
a firm determines its board composition due to the available director supply, Knyazeva et al. (2013) 
shows that board composition is largely determined by local director supply. We thus use local 
demographics—proxied by the zip code of a firm’s headquarters—as an instrument for its board 
composition. Using this instrument is also consistent with the resource dependency view of the 
board: the board serves to connect the firm with the resources it needs to operate effectively 
(Pfeffer 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). To the extent that the board needs to understand the 
local environment, a firm’s choice of directors should represent the locality in which it operates. 
Becker et al. (2011), for example, use local demographics (wealth density) as an instrument when 
examining the impact of large shareholders on corporate performance.  
We use two variables to instrument for board tenure diversity: local cost of living and the 
amount of water area (as opposed to land area) where the firm is headquartered. The logic for using 
the two instruments is as follows. Cost of living (measured as average house price scaled by 
average income) negatively impacts the availability of local professional talent (Board of Trade 
2015). As previously documented (Zald 1969), board composition is largely determined by the 
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local labor supply. If a firm is located in a more expensive area, there will be fewer professionals 
to draw upon for director roles and thus the ability to find qualified board members will be 
impacted.11 We would expect that, in locations with a higher cost of living, tenure diversity would 
be lower as well. Our second instrument, the amount of local area composed of water, proxies for 
accessibility. Historically, cities located around bodies of water have had better accessibility for 
commerce and otherwise (Population Reference Bureau 2003). Areas with more developed 
commerce will not only have a greater pool of local talent for directorships, but they will also be 
more attractive to out-of-state directors due to easier access to board meetings. We expect that 
firms in localities surrounded by water (high water area) will have higher tenure diversity due to 
the greater ease of finding board members.  
The instruments appear to pass the statistical tests of relevance as presented in Table 4 Panel 
B. In the first stage regression, both of these instruments are highly significant in the direction 
predicted. Cost of living (where high figures indicate less affordable areas) is negative and a 
significant predictor of tenure diversity (coefficient of -0.004, p-value of 0.004 for CV_TenureBD 
and coefficient of -0.004 and p-value of 0.001 for HHI_TenureBD), while local water area is a 
positive and significant predictor of tenure diversity (coefficient of 0.010, p-value of 0.002 for 
CV_TenureBD and coefficient of 0.005 and p-value of 0.011 for HHI_TenureBD). Eigenvalues of 
15.02 for CV_TenureBD and 29.53 for HHI_TenureBD exceed the rule of thumb (10) and the 5% 
threshold (11.04, in this case), rejecting the hypothesis that the two instruments are jointly weak 
and suggesting that the two instruments are jointly relevant.  
                                                          
11 Bureau of Labor Statistics data appear to confirm this argument. Some of the areas with the highest CEO quotient 
(concentration of professionals with CEO titles relative to other jobs) are in relatively low cost of living metropolitan 
areas. Since directors are generally drawn from the pool of executives, lower cost of living areas, which are associated 
with a higher CEO quotient, may provide a sufficiently large pool of director candidates, allowing local firms to renew 
board talent if needed.  
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We do not believe that the two instruments directly impact our outcome variable, CEO 
turnover. While director availability is determined by the local labor market supply, the CEO labor 
market is broader and not limited to local talent. Furthermore, approximately 80% of incoming 
CEOs are insiders who were at the firm in a different senior role prior to the CEO appointment 
(Parrino 1997). Since we have two instruments for one variable that needs instrumenting, we can 
perform Sargan and Basmann tests to check for instrument validity. Based on the tests, we have 
no reason to believe that the instruments selected fail the exogeneity criteria. Neither test can reject 
instrument exogeneity for either tenure diversity variable, CV_TenureBD (p-values of 0.174 and 
0.177 for Sargan and Basmann, respectively) or HHI_TenureBD (p-values of 0.569 and 0.573). 
This test gives us confidence that our instruments are valid. However, the test of instrumented 
variables (our original tenure diversity variable) shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the instrumented variable is exogenous for the HHI_TenureBD measure (Durbin Chi-Squared 
4.554, p-value 0.103 and Wu Hausman F-stat of 2.253 with p-value of 0.105). If tenure diversity 
is truly exogenous, then the OLS/logit estimates are more efficient than the instrumental variable 
estimates, and those should be used.  
Using the two-stage instrumental variable approach, we re-estimate our main analyses. Tenure 
diversity, previously found to be associated with greater CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, 
continues to exhibit a similar association (p-values of 0.044 and 0.087, respectively). The results 
in aggregate suggest that our analyses may be robust to the main types of endogeneity that could 
threaten the findings in this setting.  
One of the concerns of the analysis is whether tenure diversity only proxies for tenure length 
or whether it captures boards where tenure length is neither long enough for boards to become 
entrenched nor short enough for them to be captured. To show whether tenure diversity has an 
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incremental effect above and beyond average tenure length, we control for tenure length in all of 
our specifications. This does not change the inferences regarding the impact of tenure diversity on 
monitoring, as measured by turnover-performance sensitivity. Tenure-diverse boards are 
significantly more turnover-performance sensitive relative than less tenure-diverse boards. In 
contrast, tenure length itself does not exhibit any association with turnover-performance 
sensitivity. The results seem to point to the importance of periodic board renewal to ensure the 
tenure diversity mix but do not seem to indicate that imposing terms limits, which would decrease 
average tenure but may not affect tenure diversity itself, would necessarily be effective in 
improving board monitoring.  
Tenure diversity and the quality of CEO replacement decision 
Though studies have established that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is a good test of board 
effectiveness, another explanation for the result could be that diverse boards are “trigger-happy.” 
To ensure our result is not merely capturing this attitude, we examine post-CEO replacement firm 
performance, as measured by the increase in market value. Table 5 shows the estimation of the 
likelihood of an increase in market value following CEO replacement. The tenure-diverse boards, 
which are more performance sensitive when replacing the CEO, are also more likely to experience 
an increase in market value in the year after the new CEO arrives. The dependent variable is 
MV_Increase, which takes the value 1 if the firm has in increase in market value following CEO 
replacement. The coefficients on the two tenure diversity measures are statistically significant (p-
values of 0.007 and 0.091 for CV_TenureBD and HHI_TenureBD, respectively). The results seem 
to imply that tenure-diverse boards make better CEO turnover decisions, rendering the “trigger-
happy” explanation less plausible. 
5. Audit committee tenure diversity and the likelihood of restatements 
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CEO disciplining is only one aspect of board monitoring. Although governance studies have 
largely focused on dismissal because it represents an outcome solely within the discretion of the 
board, other firm outcomes can, at least partially, be attributed to a board’s effectiveness. For 
example, boards are also tasked with reviewing financial reporting integrity (audit committee 
task), reviewing and establishing CEO compensation (compensation committee task), and 
providing general strategic guidance to management. 
One of the main responsibilities of the audit committee is reviewing financial statements. The 
goal of this review is to lend integrity to financial reporting and prevent restatements. Restatements 
hurt firm valuation (Palmrose et al. 2004) and harm directors’ reputations, as evidenced by a 
reduction in the number of other directorships held by directors serving on boards of firms that 
restate their financial reports (Srinivasan 2005). In line with this argument, many of the Sarbanes-
Oxley directives, which aimed to ensure greater financial reporting integrity, focused on improving 
board competency and independence.  
Studies have found links between board characteristics and financial reporting outcomes. 
Dechow et al. (1996), Beasley (1996), and Farber (2005) all demonstrate an association between 
the percentage of insiders on the board and financial reporting quality using a sample of firms 
subject to SEC enforcement actions. Similarly, Klein (2002) shows that audit committee 
independence is inversely related to the level of earnings management.  
If tenure-diverse audit committees are better at monitoring management, we would expect 
them to be more likely to catch financial reporting errors or fraud prior to the release of financial 
statements. Consequently, we would expect firms with tenure-diverse boards or, more precisely, 
more tenure-diverse audit committees, to experience fewer accounting restatements as a result of 
the board’s diligence. 
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To examine whether tenure-diverse audit committees are better at monitoring management 
with regard to financial reporting choices, we examine whether audit committees’ tenure diversity 
affects the likelihood of a major restatement occurring in the next three years, an approach 
previously used by Daines et al. (2010). Specifically, we estimate the following regression model:  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2−5𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6−9𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10−14𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽15−23𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀                                                            (𝟐) 
                                                                                                                                              
The dependent variable, Restatementit, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm announces 
an income decreasing restatement in years t+1, t+2, or t+3 and 0 otherwise. A negative coefficient 
on 𝛽1 would indicate that firms with tenure-diverse boards are less likely to experience a negative 
(income/equity decreasing) accounting restatement. To the extent that restatements indicate the 
audit committee’s ineffectiveness, we would conclude that audit committees with a lower 
likelihood of a restatement are better at their duties.  
Findings provide some evidence that this is true. The results in the logit model in Table 6 show 
that firms with tenure-diverse audit committees are less likely to have restatements, as measured 
using CV_TenureAC (coefficient -0.205, p-value 0.088). The results of the logit model using 
HHI_TenureAC are not statistically significant (coefficient -0.108, p-value of 0.591). After 
including firm fixed effects in models (2) and (5) in Table 6, however, audit committees with 
higher tenure diversity are significantly less likely (p-values of 0.091 and 0.009 respectively) to 
experience an accounting restatement in the following three years when we measure tenure 
diversity as CV_TenureAC and HHI_TenureAC, respectively. Using a linear probability 
specification with firm fixed effects, rather than a conditional logit with firm fixed effects, in 
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models (3) and (6) yields similar results (p-values of 0.088 and 0.009, respectively). The findings 
are generally consistent with the prediction that tenure-diverse boards are better at monitoring 
management due to their increased independence. 
Tenure diversity and post-restatement CEO replacement decision 
Restatements can signal one of the two things: 1) poor underlying accounting quality, i.e., weak 
monitoring, or 2) stronger ex-post detection of prior issues, i.e., strong monitoring (Dyck et al. 
2010). While a lack of restatements has more commonly been interpreted in the literature as 
indicating tighter monitoring, we further investigate this interpretation by examining board actions 
post-restatement. Although CEO dismissal is often seen as a result of a CEO’s performance, there 
are instances where a CEO is replaced for other reasons, such as to restore investor confidence 
following a reputation-damaging event. Chakravarthy et al. (2014) find that replacing the 
executive team is one of the methods companies use most frequently to attempt to repair reputation 
following a restatement. Replacing management is a way for the board to communicate to its 
investors that it takes financial reporting integrity seriously and that it will not tolerate damage to 
firm value. To the extent that tenure-diverse boards show less tolerance for actions that harm the 
firm, we would expect them to be more inclined to replace the CEO, conditional on experiencing 
a restatement. To examine whether our conjecture holds, we estimate the following model: 
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3−6𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7−10𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11−15𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽16−19𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀               (𝟑) 
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The dependent variable, CEO_Turnoverit, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO was 
replaced within six months of the restatement announcement in models (1) and (2) of Table 7 or 
within 12 months of the restatement announcement in models (3) and (4) of the same table and 0 
otherwise. To account for the potential difference in the severity of the restatements across tenure-
diverse and nontenure-diverse boards, we control for restatement magnitude. The control variable 
Restatement_Magnitude is a continuous variable measured as the dollar amount restated scaled by 
total assets. We control for other dimensions of diversity as well as for other firm, governance and 
CEO characteristics, as shown in Table 7. The sample in this regression model is significantly 
smaller, 870 observations, as it is limited to the subsample of restating firms within the original 
sample. 
The results in Table 7 indicate that tenure diversity increases the likelihood that a CEO will be 
fired in the six months (p-values 0.074 and 0.011, depending on the tenure diversity measure used) 
or in the 12 months (p-values of 0.011 and <0.000) following a restatement. This finding suggests 
that tenure-diverse boards are not only less likely to experience a restatement but, should such a 
restatement occur, they are also more prompt in replacing a CEO who damaged the firm’s 
reputation, presumably in a bid to restore investor confidence and improve performance.12 Taken 
together, the results in Tables 6 and 7 point to the interpretation that tenure-diverse audit 
committees and boards are stricter monitors of financial reporting. 
 
6. Compensation committee tenure diversity and CEO compensation 
                                                          
12 Although we have no reason to believe that better boards would be more magnitude-sensitive when replacing the 
CEO following a restatement, we examine the possibility in an untabulated analysis given studies that document the 
importance of magnitude in assessing severity of a problem (e.g. Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004). We interact 
tenure diversity with magnitude and find that, while the coefficient on tenure diversity is still significantly positive 
(the main effect), the interaction term is not statistically significant. The findings indicate that tenure diverse board 
are not more magnitude sensitive when replacing the CEO; instead, tenure-diverse boards are more likely to replace 
the CEO following a restatement, irrespective of the restatement magnitude.  
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Another context in which boards’ monitoring ability is often examined is that of CEO 
compensation. Boards considered to be better monitors are found to award less excess 
compensation to their CEOs. Adams and Ferreira (2009) examine the compensation practices of 
gender-diverse boards but find no evidence that these boards award less overall compensation to 
the CEO. Their findings are attributed to the infrequent appointment of women to compensation 
committees and the complexity of CEO contracts.  
We use CEO compensation as another setting to examine the role of director tenure diversity. 
If tenure-diverse boards better understand appropriate CEO compensation and if they are more 
independent and less collusive, the CEOs of their firms should be less overcompensated. However, 
if perspective diversity makes the committee indecisive regarding the appropriate level of 
compensation, we would not expect the diverse board to be any better at setting an appropriate 
level of compensation than a homogeneous board.  
We examine the role of tenure diversity on total excess compensation and the likelihood of 
awarding any excess compensation to the CEO. To derive excess compensation, we first estimate 
normal compensation using the following model: 
𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1−8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9−12𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
                                             𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛆                                      (4a) 
We regress the natural log of total compensation (ln(CEOTotalComp)) on the factors believed 
to be the determinants of CEO compensation, as documented by Core et al. (1999), among others, 
such as firm and CEO characteristics, firm performance, performance volatility, two-digit SIC 
industry code, firm location, and year fixed effects. 13  Using coefficient estimates from the 
                                                          
13 More precisely, we include the following variables in the first stage: Firm Size, Sales Growth, ROA, ROA Volatility, 
Stock Returns, Stock Return Volatility, Business and Geographic Segments, CEO Age, CEO Gender, CEO Tenure, 
and CEO Duality. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. We also include CEO Power, which we measure by 
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estimated model, we calculate excess compensation as the difference between the actual and the 
predicted total compensation. Using excess compensation as the dependent variable (continuous 
variable Excess_Comp and indicator variable Excess_Comp_Dummy for any excess 
compensation), we estimate the following model: 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
                           𝛽4−7𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
                           𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀                                                                                                          (4b) 
 
The results in Table 8 indicate that tenure-diverse compensation committees award less excess 
compensation and are less likely to award any excess compensation. The coefficients on tenure 
diversity are negative in the first two models examining the level of excess compensation and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (p-values of 0.001 and 0.001). Similarly, tenure diversity is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of awarding any excess compensation (p-values of 0.042 
and 0.015, respectively). The compensation analysis indicates that tenure-diverse compensation 
committees are stricter monitors that award less excess compensation and are less likely to 
overcompensate their CEOs.  
 
7. Tenure diversity and firm performance 
In addition to being tasked with assessing and disciplining CEOs, boards also provide strategic 
advice. In that sense, the advisory role of a board is a way to monitor the CEO’s performance ex-
ante, instead of—or in addition to—assessing performance ex-post and taking appropriate action, 
which may include CEO replacement. Though Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2012) find that boards 
mostly act in the monitoring role and devote much less time to the advisory role, they indicate that 
                                                          
the length of the CEO’s official title. In addition, we include year indicators, two-digit industry indicators and 
headquarter location (metropolitan area) indicators, as all of these factors are believed to impact CEO compensation.  
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approximately one-third of all issues discussed at board meetings are of an advisory nature. If 
tenure-diverse boards are better at monitoring, they should be better at monitoring in both the pre-
replacement and the post-replacement periods. As such, one would expect that firms with tenure-
diverse boards have better financial performance.  
Studies, however, find that a board’s monitoring and advisory roles are not always compatible. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), for example, find that gender-diverse boards, which perform better at 
ex-post monitoring, do not have better firm performance than boards without female directors. In 
fact, after controlling for endogeneity, such firms’ performance is worse. They attribute their 
findings to the cost of excess monitoring. An alternative explanation could be that the benefits of 
diversity may not be as relevant in this setting. In their advisory capacity, boards perform tasks 
that are usually more routine and less stressful. Under such conditions, dysfunctional group 
behavior, which is the primary concern of regulators focused on governance reform, is less likely, 
and independence plays a less important role. Additionally, by fostering disagreement, excess 
diversity can be counterproductive when tasks are routine (Jehn et al. 1999). To test whether tenure 
diversity impacts the board’s effectiveness in ensuring better firm performance, we estimate the 
following model:  
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡+1
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2−5𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6−8𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9−13𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14−17𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑠 +  𝜀                                                                                           (𝟓) 
 
We define firm performance in two ways. In Table 9, we first examine firm performance in 
the context of future stock performance (Returnst+1), measured as year t+1 annual stock returns, 
value-weighted index adjusted, and compounded monthly. Subsequently, we estimate the same 
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model using return on assets (ROAt+1) as the measure of firm performance. In the model, ROA is 
measured in period t+1 as income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets.  
Table 9 presents the results of the analysis. Tenure diversity appears not to be associated with 
higher future performance, in terms of stock returns. However, there is some limited evidence that 
it is associated with higher future ROA (p-values of 0.089 and 0.013 for the two measures of tenure 
diversity) using the instrumental variable approach. The regression models including firm fixed 
effects, standard OLS, or Arellano-Bond method, 14  however, produce no evidence of an 
association between tenure diversity and future superior performance. This result is consistent with 
the Adams and Ferreira study (2009), which shows that better monitoring, ex-post, does not 
indicate a board that is better at guiding the CEO from a strategic/advisory perspective.  
 
8. Conclusion 
The results of this study are consistent with the assertion that diversity affects board effectiveness. 
Specifically, this study provides support for the argument that tenure-diverse boards may more 
diligently monitor management on account of their increased independence. Unlike boards where 
most directors have long tenures, tenure-diverse boards have at least some directors who have not 
been present long enough to become entrenched. Unlike boards where most directors have short 
tenures, tenure-diverse boards have at least some directors who have been in their positions long 
enough not to be “captured” by the CEO and who have more firm-specific governance experience. 
More importantly, because the directors on a tenure-diverse board do not join the board 
simultaneously, they are less likely to exhibit a cohort mentality and to become too friendly 
                                                          
14 Arellano-Bond is a standard dynamic panel data particularly useful in instances where N is large and the number of 
time periods is small. Given the possibility of the dynamic relationship between tenure diversity and firm performance, 
use of a dynamic estimator model seems appropriate as it allows for feedback from the lagged value of performance 
to the current value of tenure diversity, thereby addressing the issue of potential reverse causality.  
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cohesive—in other words, to become a “groupthink board.” Excessive cohesiveness is the most 
important pre-condition for groupthink, resulting in an insufficiently skeptical board (Janis 1982). 
Unlike other dimensions of tenure diversity, which rely on the assumption that directors with 
different characteristics will have different opinions, tenure diversity does not have to rely on such 
an assumption, even though tenure-diverse boards may hold a broader set of views; for tenure 
diversity to stem groupthink, it must only lead to less cohesiveness. 
The findings regarding tenure diversity, which can be a byproduct of a periodic board renewal, 
may be but are not necessarily consistent with more recent assertions regarding the benefits of 
introducing new directors through mandatory retirement and term limits.15 Although mandatory 
term limits will decrease average director tenure, they may or may not increase tenure diversity 
for all boards. Boards that tend to have a very long average tenure would increase tenure diversity 
by implementing tenure limits. Overall, the benefits of tenure diversity are derived from 
monitoring and disciplining underperforming CEOs. Though there is only limited evidence that 
tenure diversity increases firm performance, it may shield investors from unfavorable and 
reputation-damaging events. The findings of this study indicate that such diversity may provide a 
more organic way to enhance director independence and, in turn, improve governance. 
  
                                                          
15 See, for instance, a publication from PricewaterhouseCoopers titled “Continuing the Conversation: Board 
Renewal,” Fall 2011.   
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Appendix 
Dependent Variables Definition (Data Source if not Compustat) 
  CEO_Turnover Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO changes involuntarily in year t+1, 0 
otherwise. Turnover is classified as voluntary versus involuntary based on Parrino 
(1997). In the turnover after restatement test, the indicator variable is equal to 1 if 
the turnover occurs within six months of the restatement announcement or within 
12 months of the restatement announcement, depending on the model 
(Execucomp & AuditAnalytics).  
 CEO Compensation Total compensation earned by the CEO in year t, as reported in ExecuComp, 
variable tdc1.  
 Excess_Comp The total amount of excess compensation awarded to a firm's CEO, where excess 
compensation is calculated as actual compensation - predicted compensation. The 
prediction model for predicted compensation is described in the compensation 
table (ExecuComp). 
 Excess_Comp_Dummy Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm awards any excess compensation, i.e., if the 
excess compensation as defined above is greater than zero, 0 otherwise 
(ExecuComp). 
 MV_Increase Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm experiences an increase in market value, 0 
otherwise. 
  Restatement Following Daines et al. (2010), an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm announces 
a negative (income/equity decreasing) restatement in any of the years t+1, t+2, or t+3, 
and 0 otherwise (AuditAnalytics). 
  ROA t+1 Ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets at the end of year t+1. 
 Stock Returns t+1 Annual market-adjusted (value-weighted) returns for year t+1, compounded 
monthly. 
Main Variables Definition (Data source if not Compustat) 
Tenure Diversity BD, CC, AC 
         
Tenure diversity is defined in two ways, using coefficient of variation 
(CV_Tenure) and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI_Tenure). The two 
definitions are further explained below. The calculation is done either at the board 
level (denoted by subscript BD), audit committee level (denoted by subscript AC), 
or compensation committee level (denoted by subscript CC).  
                    CV_Tenure Calculated as CVit = it /it, where mean and standard deviation are based 
on the tenures of each director on board (or compensation committee or 
audit committee) of the firm.  
   HHI_Tenure 
First, tenure length of each director is sorted into one of 10 categories 
based on deciles. Then the following calculation is performed:   
HHI_tenure = 1 – ∑ (
Total Directors in Category𝑥
Total
Directors) .210𝑥=1  
  
Control Variables Definition (Data Source if not Compustat) 
 BD Age Diversity Coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) of board members’ ages on 
board i at time t (BoardEx).  
 BD Expertise Diversity Calculated using the following formula, after classifying each director into one of 
16 functional expertise categories: BD Expertise Diversity = 1 – 
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∑ (Total Directors in Category𝑥/Total Directors)
216
𝑥=1 (BoardEx + 
hand-collection).  
 BD Gender Diversity Indicator variable equal to 1 if board i has at least one female director in year t, 0 
otherwise (BoardEx).  
 BD Nationality 
Diversity 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if board i has at least one director who is not American 
in year t, 0 otherwise (BoardEx + hand-collection).  
 Board Independence Percentage of the board directors considered unaffiliated in year t (BoardEx).  
 Board Size Natural log of the number of directors on the board at the end of period t 
(BoardEx).  
 Book to Market Ratio of book value (total assets - total liabilities) to market value of equity in year 
t. 
 Business Segments Number of reporting business segments measured in year t.  
 CEO Age Age of the CEO at the end of the period t (ExecuComp). 
 CEO Duality Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the company’s chairman, 0 
otherwise (ExecuComp).  
 CEO Gender Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is female, 0 otherwise (ExecuComp).  
 CEO’s Pay Slice % of total compensation paid to the top five earners claimed by the CEO 
(ExecuComp).  
 CEO Tenure Number of years, measured at the end of year t, that the CEO has been at the 
position (ExecuComp).  
 Firm Size Natural log of total assets in year t.  
 Geographic Segments Number of reporting geographic segments measured in year t. 
 Institutional Ownership % of float shares held by institutional investors in year t (Thomson Financial).  
 Leverage Sum of long- and short-term debt divided by average total assets in year t. 
 Log(Sales) Natural log of total revenue in year t. 
  Market Value Market value of equity at the end of the period t. 
  Restatement_Magnitude Total $ amount restated (AuditAnalytics) divided by total assets in year t. 
 Return Skewness Calculated as 
1
𝑁
∗  ∑ [(R𝑑 − µ)/σ]
3𝑁
𝑛=1 , following Bali et al. (2011).  
  ROA Net income excluding extraordinary items divided by average total assets in period 
t.  
  ROA Volatility Standard deviation of annual ROA over the three-year period preceding year t. 
  Sales Growth % increase in sales from year t-1 to year t.  
  Stock Returns Annual market-adjusted (CRSP value-weighted) returns for year t-1, compounded 
monthly (CRSP).  
  Stock Volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over three years prior to t (CRSP).  
 Tenure Length Average tenure length for all directors on the board of firm i in year t. For the tests 
related to audit committee or compensation committee decisions, the variable is 
calculated at the audit committee level (denoted by subscript AC) or compensation 
committee level (denoted by subscript CC), respectively.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample summary statistics 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 1,966 unique firms over the five years from 2000 to 2012, 
for a total of 13,903 firm-years. To be included in the sample, each firm had to be in BoardEx and 
Execucomp and meet the minimum data requirements. All Compustat variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile. 
 
Panel A - Firm Characteristics         
Variable n       Mean Median 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Firm Size 13903 7.674 7.529 6.504 8.713 
Log(Sales) 13903 7.412 7.345 6.355 8.436 
Book to Market 13903 0.533 0.455 0.276 0.689 
Return on Assets (ROA) 13903 0.048 0.051 0.018 0.092 
Leverage 13903 0.222 0.202 0.054 0.340 
ROA Volatility 13903 0.041 0.020 0.009 0.047 
Stock Volatility 13903 0.118 0.101 0.071 0.144 
Market Value 13903 7.642 7.511 6.562 8.621 
Stock Returns 13903 0.122 0.033 -0.156 0.261 
CEO Turnover 13903 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO Compensation (1,000s) 13903 5689.839 3430.456 1674.738 6728.068 
Restatement 13903 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 
            
Panel B - Board & CEO Characteristics       
  n       Mean Median 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Tenure Diversity: CV_Tenure 13903 0.674 0.668 0.502 0.840 
Tenure Diversity: HHI Tenure 13903 0.692 0.735 0.640 0.792 
Board Gender Diversity 13903 0.645 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Board Age Diversity 13903 0.122 0.117 0.091 0.148 
Board Expertise Diversity 13903 0.716 0.722 0.690 0.750 
Board Nationality Diversity 13903 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO Age 13903 55.268 55.000 50.000 60.000 
CEO Gender 13903 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO Tenure 13903 7.679 5.586 2.751 10.005 
CEO’s Pay Slice 13903 0.380 0.381 0.306 0.451 
CEO Duality 13903 0.556 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Institutional Ownership 13903 0.716 0.772 0.611 0.888 
Board Size 13903 2.015 2.079 1.792 2.197 
Board Independence 13903 0.831 0.857 0.786 0.889 
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TABLE 2 
Summary statistics: low versus high tenure diversity boards 
This table shows differences in firm and governance characteristics between firms with low board tenure 
diversity and firms with high board tenure diversity. The low board tenure diversity firms are those that are 
below median on the tenure diversity measure, and the high board tenure diversity firms are the firms above 
the median of the sample. All variables are defined in the appendix. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and 
* for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
Board Tenure Diversity: 
CV_Tenure 
Board Tenure Diversity:  
HHI Tenure 
Variable 
Low 
N=6952 
High 
N=6951 
Diff  
(Low-High) 
Low 
N=6952 
High 
N=6951 
Diff  
(Low-High) 
Firm Characteristics             
Firm Size 7.603 7.744 - 0.140*** 7.296 8.056 -0.760*** 
Log(Sales) 7.294 7.530 - 0.236*** 7.002 7.827 -0.825*** 
Book to Market 0.533 0.533   0.000 0.546 0.519  0.027*** 
Leverage 0.229 0.216   0.014*** 0.208 0.237 -0.029*** 
Business Segments 2.644 3.030  -0.386*** 2.559 3.118 -0.559*** 
Geographic Segments 2.867 3.131  -0.264*** 2.835 3.165 -0.330*** 
Firm Age 32.105 43.983 -10.878*** 28.515 46.975 -18.460*** 
Firm Performance             
ROA 0.047 0.050 -0.002 0.047 0.050 -0.003** 
ROA Volatility 0.042 0.040  0.003*** 0.047 0.035  0.013*** 
Stock Volatility 0.122 0.115  0.006*** 0.129 0.108  0.021*** 
Market Value 7.575 7.709 -0.134*** 7.329 7.958 -0.629*** 
Stock Returns 0.130 0.114 0.016 0.154 0.090  0.064*** 
CEO Characteristics             
CEO Age 55.087 55.449 -0.362*** 55.192 55.345 -0.153 
CEO Gender 0.025 0.028 -0.004 0.026 0.027 -0.000 
CEO Tenure 7.773 7.585  0.188 8.261 7.090  1.171*** 
CEO’s Pay Slice 0.380 0.381 -0.001 0.373 0.387 -0.014*** 
CEO Duality 0.561 0.551  0.010 0.515 0.597 -0.082*** 
Governance Characteristics           
Board Gender Diversity 0.618 0.672 -0.055*** 0.519 0.772 -0.252*** 
Board Age Diversity 0.119 0.125 -0.007*** 0.125 0.119  0.005*** 
Board Experience 
Diversity 0.716 0.716  0.001 0.712 0.720 -0.007*** 
Board Nationality 
Diversity 0.208 0.225 -0.017** 0.158 0.275 -0.117*** 
Institutional Ownership 0.731 0.702  0.029*** 0.720 0.714  0.006 
Board Size 1.976 2.053 -0.078*** 1.901 2.129 -0.228*** 
Board Independence 0.828 0.834 -0.006*** 0.813 0.849 -0.036*** 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation table 
This table presents Pearson’s correlation of variables. Bolded values indicate correlation significance at the 5% level or better. All 
variables are defined in the appendix.  
 
Firm Characteristics Board Characteristics
F
ir
m
 S
iz
e
L
o
g
(S
al
es
)
B
o
o
k
 t
o
 M
ar
k
et
R
O
A
L
ev
er
ag
e
R
O
A
 V
o
la
ti
li
ty
S
to
ck
 V
o
la
ti
li
ty
M
ar
k
et
 V
al
u
e
A
n
n
u
al
 R
et
u
rn
s
C
E
O
 A
g
e
C
E
O
 G
en
d
er
C
E
O
 T
en
u
re
C
E
O
's
 P
ay
 S
li
ce
C
E
O
 D
u
al
it
y
In
si
d
er
 O
w
n
er
sh
ip
B
o
ar
d
 S
iz
e
B
o
ar
d
In
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
G
en
d
er
 D
iv
er
si
ty
A
g
e 
D
iv
er
si
ty
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
D
iv
er
si
ty
N
at
io
n
al
it
y
 
D
iv
er
si
ty
T
en
u
re
 D
iv
er
si
ty
: 
C
V
_
T
en
u
re
T
en
u
re
 D
iv
er
si
ty
: 
H
H
I
Firm Size 1.00 0.88 0.06 0.03 0.27 -0.27 -0.29 0.85 -0.08 0.10 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.19 -0.03 0.56 0.20 0.37 -0.16 0.12 0.26 0.05 0.14
Log(Sales) 0.88 1.00 -0.03 0.14 0.16 -0.27 -0.28 0.79 -0.06 0.11 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.01 0.55 0.19 0.41 -0.16 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.18
Book to Market 0.06 -0.03 1.00 -0.36 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.33 -0.19 0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.01
ROA 0.03 0.14 -0.36 1.00 -0.20 -0.32 -0.21 0.29 0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.00 -0.07 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01
Leverage 0.27 0.16 0.00 -0.20 1.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.18 0.09 0.11 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.03
ROA Volatility -0.27 -0.27 0.01 -0.32 -0.07 1.00 0.41 -0.24 0.09 -0.08 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09 -0.18 -0.02 -0.13 0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09
Stock Volatility -0.29 -0.28 0.05 -0.21 -0.04 0.41 1.00 -0.30 0.18 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.24 -0.09 -0.19 0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10
Market Value 0.85 0.79 -0.33 0.29 0.07 -0.24 -0.30 1.00 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.46 0.13 0.32 -0.15 0.12 0.28 0.04 0.13
Annual Returns -0.08 -0.06 -0.19 0.11 -0.02 0.09 0.18 0.02 1.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05
CEO Age 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 0.05 -0.01 1.00 -0.06 0.41 0.02 0.28 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.03 0.00
CEO Gender -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 1.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02
CEO Tenure -0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.41 -0.06 1.00 0.00 0.26 0.01 -0.20 -0.24 -0.16 0.03 -0.11 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04
CEO's Pay Slice 0.05 0.07 -0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.18 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.06
CEO Duality 0.19 0.20 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.10 -0.06 0.16 -0.01 0.28 -0.03 0.26 0.09 1.00 -0.01 0.10 0.05 0.11 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.05
Institutional Ownership -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.15 -0.01 -0.09 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.01 1.00 -0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.03
Board Size 0.56 0.55 0.01 0.00 0.18 -0.18 -0.24 0.46 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.20 0.09 0.10 -0.07 1.00 0.61 0.48 -0.10 0.14 0.25 0.15 0.29
Board Independence 0.20 0.19 0.02 -0.07 0.09 -0.02 -0.09 0.13 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.24 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.61 1.00 0.27 -0.09 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.16
Gender Diversity 0.37 0.41 -0.02 0.03 0.11 -0.13 -0.19 0.32 -0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.16 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.48 0.27 1.00 -0.09 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.21
Age Diversity -0.16 -0.16 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.07 -0.15 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 1.00 0.00 -0.06 0.08 -0.04
Experience Diversity 0.12 0.10 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.12 -0.02 -0.08 0.06 -0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.02 0.09
Nationality Diversity 0.26 0.24 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.28 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.25 0.14 0.14 -0.06 0.11 1.00 0.03 0.10
Tenure Diversity: CV_Tenure 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.03 1.00 0.54
Tenure Diversity: HHI_Tenure 0.14 0.18 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.10 0.13 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.29 0.16 0.21 -0.04 0.09 0.10 0.54 1.00
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TABLE 4 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and tenure diversity 
Panel A of this table shows a logistic, linear probability model with firm fixed effects and instrumental 
variable 2SLS regressions models. In the first three models, CV_Tenure is used to measure tenure diversity, 
while the last three models, HHI_Tenure is used to measure tenure diversity. Panel B of this table presents 
the first stage regression with two instruments used to estimate predicted tenure diversity. Controls and 
fixed effects from the second stage are included in the first stage but not presented in the table. The results 
of various diagnostic tests to validate instrument relevance and exogeneity are included at the bottom of 
Panel B. All variables are defined in the appendix. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Numbers in parentheses are two-sided p-values. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
PANEL A
Logit LPM FFE IV Logit LPM FFE IV
Returns -0.674*** -0.022*** -0.308*** -0.675*** -0.022*** -0.302***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Tenure DiversityBD -0.006 -0.013 0.782 0.230 -0.020 0.780
[0.960] [0.304] [0.451] [0.316] [0.416] [0.559]
Tenure DiversityBD* Returns -0.691** -0.048*** -1.033** -0.963* -0.084*** -1.315*
[0.029] [0.001] [0.044] [0.066] [0.001] [0.087]
Tenure Length -0.043*** -0.002* -0.025*** -0.045*** -0.002 -0.023***
[0.000] [0.087] [0.005] [0.000] [0.125] [0.006]
Board Independence -0.348 -0.250*** -0.107 -0.329 -0.246*** -0.152
[0.557] [0.000] [0.752] [0.582] [0.000] [0.637]
BD Gender Diversity 0.218 0.040* -0.017 0.200 0.039* -0.001
[0.273] [0.051] [0.928] [0.324] [0.053] [0.996]
BD Age Diversity 0.084 -0.003 0.055 0.080 -0.003 0.039
[0.354] [0.729] [0.290] [0.383] [0.770] [0.556]
BD Expertise Diversity -0.456 0.122 -0.266 -0.414 0.115 0.126
[0.592] [0.132] [0.702] [0.626] [0.157] [0.788]
BD Nationality Diversity 2.660*** 0.153* 1.173*** 2.623*** 0.152* 1.047**
[0.001] [0.075] [0.006] [0.001] [0.076] [0.025]
Board Size 0.004 -0.026*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.026** -0.015
[0.965] [0.010] [0.935] [0.985] [0.010] [0.781]
Institutional Ownership -0.467*** -0.054*** -0.172** -0.475*** -0.053*** -0.203**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.041] [0.001] [0.001] [0.010]
Firm Size -0.039 -0.000 -0.034* -0.039 -0.001 -0.032*
[0.198] [0.968] [0.066] [0.202] [0.940] [0.080]
Return Volatility 0.616 -0.001 0.465 0.632 -0.001 0.501
[0.186] [0.989] [0.135] [0.173] [0.979] [0.105]
Business Segments 0.037** 0.007*** 0.016 0.035** 0.007*** 0.018*
[0.018] [0.000] [0.189] [0.024] [0.000] [0.086]
Geographic Segments 0.018 0.002 0.006 0.019 0.002 0.007
[0.126] [0.285] [0.485] [0.124] [0.274] [0.370]
Dependent Variable: CEO Turnover
Tenure Diversity: CV_Tenure Tenure Diversity: HHI_Tenure
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CEO Age 0.039*** 0.004*** 0.018*** 0.040*** 0.004*** 0.019***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
CEO Gender -0.073 -0.040* -0.067 -0.070 -0.040* -0.068
[0.730] [0.090] [0.586] [0.742] [0.095] [0.590]
CEO Tenure -0.031*** 0.005*** -0.017*** -0.031*** 0.005*** -0.017***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
CEO Pay_Slice -1.979*** -0.115*** -0.874*** -1.987*** -0.115*** -0.916***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
CEO Duality 0.125 0.013* 0.091* 0.118 0.013* 0.066
[0.129] [0.079] [0.074] [0.155] [0.074] [0.144]
Constant -3.114** -0.798 -3.145** -1.026
[0.017] [0.343] [0.015] [0.214]
Controls * Returns Interaction Included Included Included Included Included Included
Fixed Effects Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind
Number of Observations 13,903 13,903 13,903 13,903 13,903 13,903
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0501 0.037 0.0502 0.037
PANEL B IV 1st Stage IV 1st Stage
(1) (2)
Instrument 1: Cost of Living
Instrument 2: Local Water Area Size
Controls Included
Fixed Effects Included
R-squared
Observations
             Durbin Score Chi-Sq
             Wu-Hausman F-test
              Sargan Chi-Sq
              Basmann Chi-Sq
Test of instrument relevance
             Minimum eigenvalue
            5% Cut-off
Tenure Diversity: CV_Tenure Tenure Diversity: HHI_Tenure
YES
Year/Industry
0.181
-0.004***
[0.004]
0.010***
[0.002]
-0.004***
[0.000]
0.005**
[0.011]
1.114  (p: 0.573)
       H0: Instruments are exogenous
  Tests of overidentifying restrictions (Instrument Validity):
13,903
4.554  (p: 0.103)
  Tests of endogeneity (Tenure Diversity)
        H0: Tenure Diversity is exogenous
2.253  (p: 0.105)
1.126  (p: 0.569)
11.595  (p: 0.003)
11.595  (p: 0.003)
3.496  (p: 0.174)
3.459  (p: 0.177)
YES
Year/Industry
0.107
13,903
15.02
11.04
       H0: Instruments are weak
29.54
11.04
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TABLE 5 
Tenure diversity and CEO replacement choice 
This table shows logistic regressions with the dependent variable being an indicator equal to 1 if a firm 
experiences an increase in market value following CEO replacement. All variables are defined in the 
appendix. Two-sided p-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Significance level is denoted by ***, **, and * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Dependent variable (MV_Increase) = 1 if there is an increase in MV, 0 otherwise
(1) (2)
Tenure Diversity:
CV_Tenure
Tenure Diversity:
HHI_Tenure
Tenure DiversityBD 0.832*** 0.953*
[0.007] [0.091]
Tenure Length 0.015 0.012
[0.597] [0.678]
Market Value t-1 -0.000 -0.000
[0.116] [0.122]
Board Independence 0.082 0.104
[0.947] [0.933]
Board Size -0.640 -0.648
[0.150] [0.152]
BD Gender Diversity -0.101 -0.097
[0.649] [0.661]
BD Age Diversity 0.895 1.147
[0.646] [0.559]
BD Expertise Diversity -0.539 -0.573
[0.752] [0.740]
BD Nationality Diversity 0.062 0.010
[0.763] [0.962]
Institutional Ownership -0.235 -0.276
[0.464] [0.392]
Firm Size 0.019 0.015
[0.816] [0.857]
Return Volatility -1.841 -1.733
[0.172] [0.204]
Business Segments 0.004 0.009
[0.907] [0.795]
Geographic Segments -0.039 -0.037
[0.179] [0.192]
Sales Growth 0.150 0.149
[0.144] [0.135]
Return on Assets -0.417 -0.476
[0.558] [0.506]
Returns Skeweness -0.153 -0.145
[0.220] [0.247]
Constant 13.453*** 13.225***
[0.000] [0.000]
CEO Controls Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Industry + Year Industry + Year
Number of Observations 867 867
R-squared 0.212 0.209
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TABLE 6 
Tenure diversity and the likelihood of an accounting restatement 
This table shows logistic regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a firm issues 
a negative restatement in years t, t+1, or t+2 and 0 otherwise (Daines, Gow, and Larcker (2010)). All 
variables are defined in the appendix. Two-sided p-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Significance level is denoted by ***, **, and * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  
Logit Logit w/ FFE LPM FFE Logit Logit w/FFE LPM FFE
Tenure DiversityAC -0.205* -0.255* -0.026* -0.108 -0.763*** -0.077***
[0.088] [0.091] [0.088] [0.591] [0.009] [0.009]
Tenure LengthAC -0.021* 0.046** 0.004** -0.023** 0.048** 0.005**
[0.071] [0.016] [0.026] [0.047] [0.011] [0.020]
Board Independence 1.076* -0.614 -0.058 1.098* -0.698 -0.063
[0.090] [0.502] [0.538] [0.084] [0.446] [0.504]
Board Size -0.109 0.185 0.024 -0.126 0.245 0.029
[0.612] [0.556] [0.465] [0.559] [0.437] [0.386]
BD Gender Diversity -0.101 0.055 0.002 -0.101 0.057 0.003
[0.278] [0.669] [0.873] [0.275] [0.658] [0.831]
BD Age Diversity 0.529 2.250* 0.218 0.432 2.075* 0.200
[0.546] [0.071] [0.105] [0.623] [0.095] [0.135]
BD Expertise Diversity -1.102 0.662 0.051 -1.107 0.655 0.042
[0.152] [0.625] [0.726] [0.151] [0.628] [0.770]
BD Nationality Diversity -0.150 -0.032 -0.002 -0.146 -0.027 -0.001
[0.146] [0.836] [0.906] [0.156] [0.861] [0.930]
Returns t-1 -0.160*** -0.145** -0.013** -0.162*** -0.149** -0.013**
[0.004] [0.048] [0.026] [0.004] [0.042] [0.024]
Institutional Ownership 0.337** 0.139 0.017 0.345** 0.148 0.017
[0.035] [0.551] [0.503] [0.031] [0.525] [0.502]
Firm Size -0.042 0.001 0.004 -0.042 -0.005 0.004
[0.243] [0.994] [0.749] [0.236] [0.967] [0.772]
Return Volatility 1.933*** 0.195 0.005 1.906*** 0.198 0.005
[0.000] [0.724] [0.936] [0.000] [0.721] [0.935]
Business Segments 0.033* 0.009 0.002 0.032* 0.010 0.002
[0.062] [0.775] [0.513] [0.067] [0.745] [0.500]
Geographic Segments 0.026 0.003 -0.001 0.025 0.005 -0.001
[0.131] [0.930] [0.704] [0.140] [0.863] [0.796]
Book to Market 0.422*** 0.307*** 0.033*** 0.420*** 0.312*** 0.032***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Sales Growth 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000**
[0.000] [0.767] [0.010] [0.000] [0.780] [0.014]
ROA t-1 -0.957*** -0.615* -0.070* -0.950*** -0.596* -0.069*
[0.003] [0.082] [0.058] [0.003] [0.089] [0.063]
Returns Skeweness 0.028 -0.023 -0.003 0.028 -0.022 -0.003
[0.480] [0.644] [0.521] [0.483] [0.672] [0.533]
Constant -1.509** -1.537**
[0.013] [0.012]
Fixed Effects Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Firm
Observations 11,170 5,097 11,170 11,170 5,097 11,170
R-squared 0.0643 0.0540 0.026 0.0638 0.0548 0.027
Tenure Diversity: 
HHI_Tenure
Tenure Diversity: 
CV_Tenure
Dependent Variable (Restatement) = 1 if restatement announced, 0 otherwise
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TABLE 7 
Post-restatement CEO turnover 
This table presents a logistic model where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
CEO departs either within six months or 12 months following a restatement announcement and 0 otherwise. 
The regression controls for restatement severity proxied by Restatement_Magnitude. All variables are 
defined in the appendix. Two-sided p-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
TABLE 8 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CV_Tenure HHI_Tenure CV_Tenure HHI_Tenure
Tenure DiversityBD 0.869* 3.083** 1.056** 4.045***
[0.074] [0.011] [0.011] [0.000]
Restatement Magnitude 31.705*** 31.152*** 20.733* 21.589**
[0.007] [0.009] [0.056] [0.043]
Tenure Length 0.023 0.011 0.018 -0.000
[0.517] [0.790] [0.584] [0.990]
BD Independence -5.871*** -5.433** -2.706 -2.002
[0.006] [0.012] [0.131] [0.281]
Board Size 0.222 -0.019 -0.466 -0.730
[0.783] [0.982] [0.477] [0.277]
BD Gender Diversity -0.167 -0.310 -0.071 -0.261
[0.670] [0.416] [0.824] [0.390]
BD Age Diversity -4.835 -3.875 -7.936** -7.064**
[0.279] [0.401] [0.022] [0.038]
BD Expertise Diversity 0.570 1.039 1.720 2.034
[0.895] [0.806] [0.635] [0.560]
BD Nationality Diversity -0.159 -0.271 -0.094 -0.267
[0.718] [0.539] [0.773] [0.427]
Institutional Ownership -0.822 -0.949* -0.287 -0.500
[0.138] [0.077] [0.567] [0.305]
Firm Size 0.285** 0.315** 0.350*** 0.402***
[0.033] [0.025] [0.002] [0.002]
Return Volatility -0.671 -0.252 1.760 2.146
[0.772] [0.910] [0.398] [0.306]
Business Segments 0.048 0.043 0.046 0.035
[0.483] [0.519] [0.410] [0.520]
Geographic Segments 0.013 0.007 0.014 0.010
[0.777] [0.878] [0.716] [0.816]
Constant -4.040*** -4.012*** -1.968* -1.908*
[0.004] [0.006] [0.086] [0.090]
CEO controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Ind
Number of Observations 870 870 870 870
R-squared 0.194 0.202 0.239 0.253
Dependent Variable = CEO_Turnover
Within 6 months of restatement 
announcement
Within 12 months of restatement 
announcement
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TABLE 8 
Tenure diversity and CEO compensation 
This table presents an OLS regression of the excess compensation residuals on tenure diversity 
and the control variables and a logistic regression with the dependent variable being an indicator 
equal to 1 if the firm awards any excess compensation to the CEO and 0 otherwise. All variables 
are defined in the appendix. Two-sided p-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. Significance level is denoted by ***, **, and * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
(1)
Tenure 
Diversity: 
CV_Tenure
(2)
Tenure 
Diversity: 
HHI_Tenure
(3)
Tenure 
Diversity: 
CV_Tenure
(4)
Tenure 
Diversity: 
HHI_Tenure
Tenure DiversityCC -0.086*** -0.283*** -0.091** -0.335**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.042] [0.015]
Tenure LengthCC -0.010*** -0.033*** -0.010*** -0.033***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
BD Gender Diversity -0.002 0.012 -0.001 0.018
[0.906] [0.864] [0.975] [0.788]
BD Age Diversity -0.268 -0.853 -0.304 -0.982
[0.193] [0.189] [0.139] [0.129]
BD Expertise Diversity 0.089 0.267 0.067 0.221
[0.754] [0.755] [0.814] [0.796]
BD Nationality Diversity 0.654*** 1.914*** 0.670*** 1.969***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
Board Size 0.034 0.013 0.032 0.012
[0.500] [0.935] [0.524] [0.937]
Board Independence 0.442*** 1.479*** 0.448*** 1.498***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Institutional Ownership 0.209*** 0.665*** 0.211*** 0.671***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Firm Size 0.018* 0.072** 0.018* 0.071**
[0.055] [0.017] [0.056] [0.017]
Book to Market 0.007 -0.047 0.005 -0.052
[0.787] [0.550] [0.829] [0.503]
ROA 0.121 0.534* 0.114 0.512
[0.241] [0.096] [0.270] [0.111]
ROA Volatility 0.330** 1.285*** 0.313** 1.211**
[0.028] [0.007] [0.037] [0.012]
Dependent variable 
(Excess_Comp):
total excess comp awarded
Dependent variable 
(Excess_Comp_Dummy):
1 if excess comp awarded, 0 
otherwise
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Returns 0.020** 0.009 0.020** 0.009
[0.024] [0.761] [0.025] [0.772]
Stock Volatility 0.084 0.017 0.077 -0.002
[0.456] [0.962] [0.492] [0.996]
Business Segments -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007
[0.230] [0.647] [0.214] [0.623]
Geographic Segments -0.004 -0.016 -0.004 -0.016
[0.347] [0.217] [0.338] [0.218]
Constant -1.172*** -4.896*** -1.164*** -4.882***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
CEO Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Industry & Year Industry & Year Industry & Year Industry & Year
Observations 13,903 13,903 13,903 13,903
R-squared 0.035 0.0246 0.033 0.0240
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TABLE 9 
Tenure diversity and future firm performance 
This table presents a regression of firm performance on tenure diversity. Firm performance is defined as value-weighted index-adjusted annual stock 
returns, measured in year t+1 and compounded monthly, or ROA (income before extraordinary items/ total assets), also measured in year t+1. All 
variables are defined in the appendix. Two-sided p-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance is 
denoted by ***, **, and * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Tenure DiversityBD 0.007 -0.282 0.017 -0.007 0.076* 0.011 0.003 -0.209 -0.057 -0.007 0.135** 0.032*
[0.701] [0.384] [0.748] [0.111] [0.089] [0.146] [0.916] [0.583] [0.617] [0.399] [0.013] [0.057]
Tenure Length -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 0.001** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 0.001** 0.000 -0.001
[0.055] [0.772] [0.999] [0.012] [0.509] [0.379] [0.055] [0.408] [0.828] [0.014] [0.509] [0.244]
Board Independence 0.068 0.058 0.115 -0.061*** -0.027* -0.016 0.067 0.085 0.114 -0.061*** -0.029** -0.016
[0.354] [0.583] [0.727] [0.001] [0.069] [0.613] [0.361] [0.390] [0.730] [0.001] [0.034] [0.599]
Board Size 0.001 0.044 0.015 0.001 -0.014* -0.013 0.002 0.031 0.026 0.001 -0.021** -0.013
[0.957] [0.451] [0.885] [0.858] [0.094] [0.305] [0.939] [0.620] [0.802] [0.883] [0.018] [0.282]
BD Gender Diversity -0.018 -0.011 0.030 -0.003 -0.006*** -0.004 -0.018 -0.007 0.031 -0.003 -0.010*** -0.004
[0.116] [0.480] [0.348] [0.412] [0.002] [0.430] [0.111] [0.713] [0.327] [0.441] [0.000] [0.391]
BD Age Diversity 0.071 0.317 0.124 -0.013 -0.029 0.102* 0.075 0.187 0.145 -0.017 0.010 0.104*
[0.511] [0.112] [0.737] [0.680] [0.306] [0.058] [0.486] [0.175] [0.688] [0.595] [0.608] [0.054]
BD Expertise Diversity -0.103 -0.120 -0.546 -0.093*** -0.095*** 0.143** -0.103 -0.084 -0.536 -0.092*** -0.116*** 0.139**
[0.323] [0.333] [0.248] [0.003] [0.000] [0.026] [0.325] [0.539] [0.257] [0.003] [0.000] [0.029]
BD Nationality Diversity -0.023** -0.024 -0.075** -0.001 -0.003 0.006 -0.023** -0.020 -0.073* -0.001 -0.006** 0.006
[0.029] [0.138] [0.048] [0.841] [0.112] [0.335] [0.029] [0.256] [0.051] [0.874] [0.013] [0.352]
Institutional Ownership -0.108*** -0.121*** -0.652*** 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.037*** -0.108***-0.111***-0.652*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.037***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Firm Size -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.460*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.015* -0.020***-0.018***-0.460*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.015*
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.125] [0.000] [0.064] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.126] [0.000] [0.065]
ROA Volatility 0.286*** 0.329*** -1.217*** -0.396*** -0.395*** -0.015 0.286*** 0.323*** -1.218*** -0.397*** -0.391*** -0.016
[0.004] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.677] [0.004] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.667]
Returnst+1 ROAt+1 Returnst+1 ROAt+1
Dependent Variable = Future Performance
Tenure Diversity: CV_Tenure Tenure Diversity: HHI_Tenure
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Business Segments -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.000
[0.614] [0.851] [0.839] [0.001] [0.000] [0.800] [0.627] [0.596] [0.841] [0.001] [0.000] [0.830]
Geographic Segments 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001
[0.285] [0.257] [0.223] [0.034] [0.012] [0.558] [0.282] [0.332] [0.224] [0.036] [0.004] [0.558]
Lag1.Returns -0.091*** -0.091***
[0.000] [0.000]
Lag2.Returns -0.039* -0.039*
[0.053] [0.052]
Lag1.Roa 0.377*** 0.376***
[0.000] [0.000]
Lag2.Roa -0.016 -0.017
[0.527] [0.509]
Constant 0.167*** 0.350 0.024 0.017 -0.039 0.052*** 0.168*** 0.291 0.074 0.017 -0.058 0.038***
[0.000] [0.569] [0.894] [0.148] [0.660] [0.000] [0.000] [0.634] [0.704] [0.185] [0.510] [0.007]
CEO Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year Ind*Year
Observations 13,903 13,903 6,952 13,903 13,903 7,732 13,903 13,903 6,952 13,903 13,903 7,732
R-squared 0.173 0.165 0.251 0.217 0.173 0.176 0.251 0.217
OLS IVModel OLS IV
Arellano-
Bond
Arellano-
Bond
Arellano-
Bond
Arellano-
Bond
OLS IV OLS IV
